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Abstract  
This article examines the intersections of violence, governance, identity and legitimacy in relation to 
autodefensas (self-defence groups) in Latin America, focusing on Mexico and Colombia. By shifting 
focus from the question of where legitimacy lies to how it is produced and contested by a range of 
groups, we challenge the often presumed link between the state and legitimacy. We develop the 
idea of a field of negotiation and contestation, firstly, to discuss and critique the concept of state 
failure as not merely a Western hegemonic claim but also a strategic means of producing legitimacy 
by autodefensas. Secondly, we employ and enrich the notion of violent pluralism to discuss the 
pervasiveness of violence and the role of neoliberalism, and to address the question of non-violent 
practices of governance. We argue that the idea of a field of contestation and negotiation helps to 
understand the complexity of relationships that encompass the production of legitimacy and identity 
through (non)violent governance, whereby lines between (non)state, (non)violence, and 
(il)legitimacy blur and transform. Yet, we do not simply dismiss (binary) distinctions as these 
continue to be employed by groups in their efforts to produce, justify, challenge, contest and 
negotiate their own and others’ legitimacy and identity.  
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1. Introduction 
On 24th February 2013 armed groups took control of the towns of Felipe Carrillo Puerto 
(known as ‘La Ruana’) and Tepalcatepec in the Tierra Caliente region of the Mexican state of 
Michoacán. Describing themselves as autodefensas (self-defence groups), they declared that they 
had risen up against the rule of the local cartel, Los Caballeros Templarios (The Knights Templar). 
The level of media attention that these groups have subsequently garnered in their struggle against 
the cartel may indicate that this phenomenon is somehow unique. In fact, neither the occurrence of 
self-defence groups, nor their deployment of the term ‘autodefensa’ is novel in Latin America. Such 
groups have emerged periodically in the region’s history, perhaps the most famous recent example 
being those that emerged in Colombia in the early 1980s. The term ‘autodefensa’, and its 
deployment by such groups, has produced debates around the degree of difference between ideas 
of self-defence and paramilitarism, often focusing on the degree to which such groups are 
defensive/offensive in their outlook and capabilities (Romero 2003: 36-37). Whilst such debates are 
interesting, this article is not concerned with adding to that literature, and simply acknowledges and 
indeed demonstrates, that the term autodefensa is deployed by a wide range of groups whose 
composition and aims vary. Instead, the focus here is on the relationship between violence, 
governance, legitimacy and identity in the context of autodefensas in Colombia and Mexico. More 
specifically, we ask how violence and governance are employed by the state, autodefensas and 
other groups to construct (legitimate) identities.  
Subsequent to their emergence in February 2013, the autodefensas of Michoacán went on 
to gain control over much of the territory of the state of Michoacán. They often set up their own 
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citizen councils to take over the government of the towns that they controlled, and disarmed much 
of the local municipal police who they perceived as having been corrupted by the cartel. Their 
growing power eventually prompted a Federal response in January 2014, and an agreement was 
reached for many of the autodefensas to be subsumed into a Rural Defence Force, armed by and 
under the aegis of the state. When the time came to demobilise in May 2014, some of the 
autodefensas refused and many of their members were subsequently jailed, whilst others became 
part of the Rural Defence Force, some of which later were institutionalised into the Michoacán State 
police.  
The autodefensas in Colombia emerged in the early to mid-1980s initially in the Magdalena 
Medio region of central Colombia. They were a direct response to the actions of the guerrillas of 
FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia). Despite the autodefensas being declared 
illegal in 1989, they continued to grow in line with the expansion of the guerrilla movements, and 
also spread to other regions of Colombia (Avilés 2006: 380). In 1997, disparate groups of 
autodefensas and paramilitaries came together to form the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) 
which was an explicitly nationwide umbrella organisation that sought to co-ordinate and further the 
aims of the groups which formed its membership (Romero 2003: 151-152). The AUC went on to 
become a major violent actor within Colombia, controlling municipalities, fighting against the 
guerrillas of FARC and the ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional), and conducting social cleansing 
operations against suspected guerrilla sympathisers within the civilian population. The AUC 
eventually demobilised, from 2004 to 2006, after the election of Alvaro Uribe as President in 2002 
signalled a major military crackdown against the guerrilla forces. Whilst many of the groups that had 
formed the AUC demobilised, others continued as before and were henceforth described as criminal 
groups (Inkster and Comolli 2012: 65).  
We examine the autodefensas in Mexico and Colombia to make sense of the production of 
legitimacy and identity through violent governance. Our aim is therefore not to compare the two 
cases or to argue they are the same or arise from similar contexts, as Mexico and Colombia clearly 
have their own histories and socio-political settings. Rather, we employ these cases to ask broader 
questions about violence, governance, legitimacy and identity, and the blurring of lines between 
state and non-state, violence and non-violence, legitimate and illegitimate. In other words, the 
article explores the ways in which autodefensas employ violence to establish governance networks, 
interact with other groups and seek to produce legitimate identities. In this context, governance 
refers to processes of ordering and regulating things, people and relations that can be undertaken by 
a range of groups (not necessarily related to the state); that might have disordering effects; and, that 
involve processes of both negotiation and contestation.  
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By shifting focus from the question of where legitimacy lies to how it is produced through 
violence by different groups, we suggest that autodefensas challenge the often presumed link 
between the state and legitimacy, as well as the (binary) distinction between legitimacy and 
violence. We contextualise this question through an engagement with and critique of two notions: 
state failure and violent pluralism (Arias and Goldstein 2010). We argue that engaging autodefensas 
in Mexico and Colombia through the question of violence, governance, identity and legitimacy 
highlights several aspects that state failure literature mostly fails to address, and which the notion of 
violent pluralism can help to examine. We develop the notion of a field of contestation and 
negotiation, firstly, to show that state failure is not merely a Western hegemonic claim but also a 
tool employed by autodefensas in their efforts to legitimatise violent governance. Secondly, the idea 
of a field of contestation and negotiation serves to enrich the notion of violent pluralism by 
addressing the intricacy of violence and non-violence in these practices of governance.   
Thus, we employ the concept of state failure not only because both Colombia and Mexico 
have been subject to both state failure literature and its critiques but also, and more interestingly, 
because the leaders of autodefensas themselves have employed the discourse of state failure. We 
are interested in how state failure operates as part of a field of contestation and negotiation 
productive of different claims to identity and legitimacy. The autodefensas’ instrumental utilisation 
of state failure discourse means it becomes a strategic means of making a claim to, or producing, 
legitimacy through violence by various groups. This means that the relationship between the state, 
autodefensas and other groups is one of opposition, tension and co-constitution simultaneously. To 
make sense of this complex field of relations, we employ the notion of violent pluralism, which 
offers a conception of politics as violent struggle constitutive of political (dis)ordering and identity in 
the Latin American context. In addition, we enrich this notion with the idea of a field of contestation 
and negotiation in order to make sense of non-violent practices and to highlight the inextricability of 
violence and non-violence. We argue that, in the context of autodefensas in Latin America, the idea 
of a field of contestation and negotiation helps to understand the complexity of relationships that 
encompass the production of legitimacy and identity through (non)violent governance, whereby 
lines between (non)state, (non)violence, and (il)legitimacy blur and transform. Yet, we do not simply 
dismiss (binary) distinctions as these continue to be employed by groups in their discursive and 
material efforts to produce, justify, challenge, contest and negotiate their own and others’ 
legitimacy and identity.  
2. State Failure: Institutions, relations and the production of knowledge  
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In 2010, then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton commented that Mexico is ‘looking more 
and more like Colombia 20 years ago’ (BBC 2010; see also: Morton 2011). Her comments resonate 
with a frequently asked question among scholars and commentators: Will Mexico ‘become 
Colombia’ of the 1990s with respect to the proliferation of non-state armed groups and the high 
incidence of violence, and in doing so exhibit characteristics of a failed state (e.g. Escalante Gonzalbo 
2009: 84-96; Pansters 2012: 6)? This perceived risk of state failure seems to be supported by 
Colombia and Mexico’s listing in the ‘elevated warning’ category of the Fragile State Index, ranking 
69th and 88th respectively (out of 188 countries)1. The Index, a collaboration between Foreign Policy 
and The Fund for Peace, ranks countries based on a wide range of (sub-)indicators – including 
‘corruption’, ‘internal conflict’, ‘protests and demonstrations’, ‘youth unemployment’, 
‘powerlessness’, ‘internet access’, ‘sanctions’ – whereby the link to state ‘failure’ or ‘fragility’ is not 
necessarily self-evident.  
These rankings and concerns reflect, we argue, a particular conception and production of 
state legitimacy and identity more than objective strength/fragility. This becomes clear by mapping 
the development of the concept of ‘failed state’. The notion first appeared in a 1992 Foreign Policy 
article, in which Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner argued that ‘From Haiti in the Western 
Hemisphere to the remnants of Yugoslavia in Europe, from Somalia, Sudan, and Liberia in Africa to 
Cambodia in Southeast Asia, a disturbing new phenomenon is emerging: the failed nation-state, 
utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community.’ The roots of the 
problem, they note, lie in the ‘vast proliferation of nation-states’ due to decolonisation in the post-
WWII period. At this time, the right to self-determination took precedence over ‘long-term 
survivability’. The problem of the failed state did not, however, surface during the Cold War as states 
were propped up through ‘hefty infusions of aid’ (Ibid.) from former colonial masters and 
superpowers due to their strategic importance.  
Of interest in their analysis is, firstly, the connection of very diverse types of states into a 
single ‘problem’ (Call 2008: 1494). Later state failure scholars are equally guilty of this, e.g. William 
Zartman’s Collapsed States, which defines ‘collapsed’ (1995: 5) as the non-performance of basic 
state functions, aggregating a diversity of states and phenomena. Secondly, they ascribe a catalysing 
effect to the end of the Cold War – another interpretation is that it was more a case of a shift in 
scholarly attention from superpower rivalry towards internal conflicts and crises. Thirdly, and equally 
significant, is the break established between the colonial and post-colonial periods, thus cutting off 
the functioning and effects of colonisation from the frame of analysis (cf. Call 2008: 1499-1500; 
Pureza et al 2006:1). Hence, it becomes possible to argue that states that gained independence after 
1945 attach too much importance to sovereignty, whereas (humanitarian) intervention, would be 
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the best – read: most cost-effective – solution to the problem of failed states (Helman and Ratner 
1992). 
The notion of failed states attracted relatively little scholarly interest during much of the 
1990s, although it did become a concern for policy makers, as demonstrated by the US intervention 
in Somalia, seen by many scholars as the collapsed state par excellence (e.g. Call 2008: 1492; Gros 
1996: 464; Pham 2009: 84; Rotberg 2002). The subsequent development of the notion and its 
broadening to include a range of situations from ‘fragility’ to ‘collapse’ (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson 
2012: 8-9, 398, 429; Chesterman, Ignatieff and Thakur 2005: 8; Etsy et al 1998; Grayson 2010: 3-4; 
Helman and Ratner 1992), continued to rely on vague definitions and arbitrary aggregations. A shift 
occurred towards the end of the 1990s, when international financial institutions became increasingly 
interested in questions of governance and state-building – their Cold War ‘neutrality’ had prevented 
broaching such issues – thus forging a link between governance and development (Call 2008: 1493). 
Another decisive shift occurred in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks, when failed 
states became cast as safe havens for terrorists and launchpads for terrorism, which could have dire 
consequences both regionally and globally (e.g. Crocker 2003; Fukuyama 2004; Hamre and Sullivan 
2002; Litwak 2007: 43; Rotberg 2002; Siegle et al 2004 – for critiques, see: Hehir 2007; Manjikian 
2008). The Failed States Index emerges in this context, first published in 2005 and renamed Fragile 
State Index in 2014.  
The perceived risk of Mexico and Colombia being or becoming failed or fragile states is 
therefore the result of a particular conception of how a modern state should operate and what 
makes it ‘strong’, ‘developed’, ‘legitimate’, etc. In this context, the ascription of failed state status 
can be seen as a Western hegemonic claim that enables intervention. Such claims rely on the logic of 
modernisation and a particular linking of development and governance, whereby both Colombia and 
Mexico are regarded as cases of under- or regressive development. As Adam Morton (2012: 1634) 
points out, traditional understandings of Colombia in the failed state literature suggest that the 
country fails to measure up to an ideal-type conception of the modern state. Failed states are 
represented in pathological terms of ‘deviance, aberration and breakdown’. Scholars such as 
Fukuyama, Huntington and Kaplan paint a picture of the postcolonial world reminiscent of The Heart 
of Darkness, as a place of ‘danger and darkness, anarchy and disorder’ (Ibid: 1635). Such conceptions 
became expressed amongst policy makers, especially in the US, as a fear that a historically weak 
state such as Colombia, plagued by internal violence, would descend into a failed state (Ibid: 1634). 
Moreover, it paved the way for US intervention in the form of a joint Colombia-US initiative known 
as Plan Colombia, which began in 2001 and lasted until 2006 (though other aid/assistance packages 
remain in place)2.  
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This ‘pathological’ thinking has also informed US policymaking towards Mexico: for instance, 
the 2008 US Joint Forces Command paper outlines the dangers of Mexico failing due to the upsurge 
of violence in the context of the war on drugs. Moreover, fearing that such problems will spread, 
Mexico, a neighbouring country, is conceived as a security threat to the USA (Ibid.: 1635; US Joint 
Forces Command 2008: 36; see also: US Joint Forces Command 2010: 47). Whilst the Mexican 
government rejected the need for a ‘Plan Mexico’, and academics such as Morton (2012: 1635) have 
described the portrayal of Mexico as a failed state as a caricature and a misunderstanding of the 
social and economic factors at play, it is clear that the notion of ‘failed’ or ‘failing’ state has had far-
reaching discursive and material effects in both Mexico and Colombia.   
Morton offers an important critique of the failed state literature as well as the ascription of 
failed state status to Mexico and Colombia, however, his is certainly not the only criticism levelled at 
this body of scholarship. Failed state literature has been the subject of sustained critiques over a 
number of years. These critiques can be roughly divided into ‘soft’ critiques, which point to the 
socially constructed and therefore changing character of institutions and identities, but which 
ultimately seek to save the concept by improving it (e.g. Frödin 2012: 278; Romero 2000: 53-54), and 
more profound critiques which question the discourse of ‘failed’, ‘collapsed’, ‘fragile’, etc. states as 
such. These latter critiques challenge the binary distinctions the softer critiques ultimately rely upon 
– legitimate vs illegitimate; civil vs uncivil; rule of law vs unrule of law (e.g. see: Koonings and Kruijt 
2004: 1-2; Kruijt 2011).  
These scholars argue that, not only is there no accepted definition of what a ‘failed’ or 
‘weak’ state is, grouping together a wide variety of states, contexts and situations (Call 2008: 1942; 
Hehir 2007: 212-213), the concept of state failure is an effect of particular relations of power, and of 
the production of knowledge. The question is therefore not whether or not, or to what extent, states 
are failing but rather how states come to be seen as failing; on what basis and according to which, 
and whose, criteria (e.g. see: Pureza et al 2006: 2). Here we come back to Morton’s point regarding 
‘pathologisation’, whereby the Western production of a particular idea of the liberal state, regarded 
as universally valid, is set against the ‘Third World State’. The effect is a conception of democratic 
states as strong and legitimate versus weak or failing states, characterised by sickness, illegitimacy 
and violence (Bilgin and Morton 2002; Morton 2012: 1634; Morton 2005: 377), and in need of 
intervention. States with ‘objectionable features’ are thus too readily conflated with those that are 
in crisis as is the case in Colombia, which has been marked as failing despite its record of relatively 
stable state institutions over several decades (Call 2008: 1500).  
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These critiques usefully illustrate how the ascription of failed state status to Colombia and 
Mexico involves the production of a particular (Western) conception of state development, identity 
and legitimacy. Yet, in the context of autodefensas, the idea of state failure functions not only as a 
Western imposition but also, we argue, as a strategic tool employed by non-state groups seeking to 
legitimise their (violent) governance. For instance, Dr Mireles, a key autodefensa leader in Mexico 
claimed that; ‘the state has offices here but the power of the state doesn’t exist here’3 (our 
translation throughout unless otherwise stated; see also: De Llano 2013; Martínez 2013: 12). In 
other statements he has taken this rhetoric further by declaring that the state was in league with 
organised crime: ‘No institution could fulfil its duties because all the authorities – from the 
municipal, to the State and Federal levels – were part of the cartels, or were being paid off by these 
cartels’4. Another important autodefensa leader, Hipólito Mora, deploring the failure of local 
government, called directly to the state and the federal government, saying: ‘We have been 
abandoned by the state as if we didn’t exist….we ask President Peña Nieto for a little attention, not 
much, just a little’ (Prados 2013). 
Thus, from the start of the mobilisations, the language of state failure was an important 
instrument for the autodefensas to claim the absence and/or corrupted character of the state, 
thereby legitimising the formation of armed groups by citizens, who were forced to take 
responsibility for their security into their own hands. By calling themselves ‘autodefensas’, they 
made clear their non-state identity – i.e. not failing – whilst constructing an identity that was not 
directly threatening to the state, and defensive in nature. At the same time, however, the claim of 
state failure was also aimed at provoking a response that would embarrass the state into action on 
their behalf. As we will go on to discuss, rather than simply an expression of state failure, the 
autodefensas can be seen as pursuing a politics of labelling by employing the notion of state failure 
to delegitimise the state and construct their own identity and legitimacy. 
Such labelling of the state as failed continued after the Federal state intervened in 
Michoacán in 2014 and attempted to institutionalise some of the autodefensas into the state 
security corps. Indeed, the autodefensa group of San Miguel de Aquila saw this very strategy as 
evidence that Michoacán was a failed state: ‘In the recent declarations of President Enrique Peña 
Nieto he is recognising that Michoacán is a failed state by proposing the integration of the 
autodefensas into the security forces of the State, something that we think doesn’t resolve the root 
causes of the problem’ (Sin Embargo 2014). And in the aftermath of this strategy such rhetoric 
continued to be used to counter the idea that it had brought security to the region: ‘It’s a farce to 
say the Federal Government has brought peace to Michoacán. We continue to live in a failed state, 
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in a state where there isn’t security, where there is no imparting of justice’ (spokesman for ‘Por un 
Coalcomán Libre de CT SDR’ statement5).  
These pronouncements, and the very presence of autodefensas, fed into a wider debate 
around the question of whether Michoacán could be categorised as a failed state, which included 
the church, politicians, civil society organisations, journalists and academics (e.g. Becerra-Acosta 
2013; Beltrán and Cruz 2013; Seguridad, Justicia y Paz 2013; Camacho and Jiménez 2014; Castellanos 
2013; López-Dóriga 2015; Rosen and Zepeda 2016: 84-85). Through their utilisation of the term and 
indeed their very presence, the autodefensas generated an intense debate around the nature and 
classification of the term ‘failed state’ as a means not only of denouncing the state but also of 
legitimating alternative forms of (violent) governance, which we will discuss in more detail next.   
 
3. Legitimising Violent Governance  
The idea that state failure is not merely a violent imposition of Western modernity but also a 
legitimating claim for (violent) governance on behalf of local non-state groups in a wider field of 
contestation can be better understood through an engagement with the notion of violent pluralism 
developed by Arias and Goldstein in their book Violent Democracies in Latin America (2010). They 
coin the term to make sense of the persistence, and intricate entwinement, of violence and 
democracy in Latin America. Violence, rather than being an outlier or representing a failure to live up 
to the standards of (a dominant Western notion of) democracy, is a key component of how state and 
society as a whole function in this region. Seeking to understand how violence operates without 
blaming it on an illiberal state, they argue that violence is not only crucial to the establishment and 
maintenance of democratic governance but also to popular challenges to the legitimacy of these.  
In the context of this article, the significance of the notion of violent pluralism lies, firstly, in 
drawing attention to the wider context of social and political relations of violence, rather than 
focusing on state-society relations only. Secondly, it is grounded in a conceptualisation of politics in 
terms of struggle and conflict productive of political ordering and subjectivity (Ibid: 19, 23). This 
enables a conceptualisation of relations – e.g. state/non-state; legitimacy/illegitimacy; 
governance/resistance – beyond binary terms, whilst acknowledging the important material and 
discursive power that such binaries continue to have. It helps develop the idea of governance as a 
field of contestation and negotiation produced by and productive of competing claims to legitimacy 
and identity by a range of state and non-state groups, whereby the delineation between these blurs.  
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Legitimacy is thus contested both as concept and in practice. Conceptually, the notion of 
violent pluralism offers a critique of approaches that identify legitimacy with the state, whereby it is 
understood as the extent to which state rule is accepted by its people without recourse to fear or 
favour to encourage endorsement (e.g. Gilley 2006). Bourdieu challenges this Weberian conception 
of the state’s legitimacy as a matter of a ‘free act of clear conscience’, arguing instead that 
legitimacy is conditioned by structures that foster a ‘pre-reflexive agreement’ with the established 
order (Bourdieu et al. 1994). That is, rule is often not actively but tacitly accepted; structures 
become normalised. As such, questions of legitimacy only arise during times of crisis; under normal 
circumstances state legitimacy goes unquestioned. In distinction, the notion of violent pluralism 
brings to light the ‘normality’ of the contestation of legitimacy and the centrality of violence to the 
everyday functioning of governance regimes in the Latin American context, and especially with 
respect to autodefensas. Legitimacy is accordingly no longer automatically identified with the state 
and with legality; it is a continuous process of contestation involving discursive and material 
practices by a range of groups (cf Dowling and Pfeffer 1975). These competing efforts to create and 
gain recognition for alternative forms of governance are productive of social change insofar as new 
forms of legitimacy and political subjectivities are created in the process.  
In his study of the Knights Templar cartel in Michoacán, Falko Ernst (2015) employs a similar 
conception of legitimacy, as a process of competition among groups, whereby the state of 
Michoacán is described in terms of ‘fractured sovereignty’. In its efforts to produce legitimacy, the 
cartel portrayed itself as a local group protecting the people of Michoacán from ‘foreign cartels’. 
They cultivated a quasi-religious identity and presented the cartel as an alternative justice system 
that represented ‘the government’ in the areas that they controlled (Ernst 2015: 141; Gil Olmos 
2015). Central to this was the ability to utilise violence to repel competing cartels as was the 
construction of the federal government as an outside aggressor. This built upon feelings of insecurity 
in populations such as in the Tierra Caliente region, in which the state was seen as corrupt and as the 
perpetrator of violence against local populations, whilst these people felt stigmatised as criminals by 
the Federal government (Ernst 2013, 2015; Gledhill 2015).  
By setting themselves up as an alternative form of governance, the cartel challenged the 
state’s identity as the legitimate source of law and order, and through their co-optation of parts of 
the local state helped to blur the line between state and non-state. This took the form of ensuring 
politicians amenable to their cause were elected into office, using bribery and threats of violence to 
ensure impunity for their actions, and using state institutions such as the municipal police as a tool 
for their interests. Therefore, whilst they would at times openly confront parts of the Federal state, 
such as the Federal Police, they were integrated into the local governance and law enforcement of 
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other parts of the local and regional state. Allegations of co-operation or at least mutual non-
aggression pacts, are also alleged to have been made between the cartel and the army – which is 
part of the Federal state – in the region (Ernst 2013; Grillo 2016).  
In line with the idea of violent pluralism, Ernst’s study shows that legitimacy is a process or 
field of contestation and negotiation whereby violence is employed both to create and undermine 
the acceptance and recognition of different groups. Similarly, the autodefensas can be seen as a 
response to the cartel’s regime of violent governance. The autodefensas positioned themselves 
against the violence and extortion of the cartel vis-à-vis the local population – although, importantly 
they did not present themselves as anti-drugs per se (an important source of revenue for many in 
the region). The autodefensas’ efforts at seeking legitimacy mirrored the strategies of the cartel 
insofar as violence was key to the contestation and establishment of a rival regime of governance. 
The autodefensas’ ability to defend the communities in which they were based was central to their 
appeal and crucial to the construction of their identity. Being armed and organised enabled them to 
take over the functions of the municipal police in towns where they were in league with the cartel 
(Martínez et al 2013). The establishement of a regime of violent governance, and the ability to 
survive the assaults of the cartel, was central to their appeal to, and ability to negotiate with, the 
regional and federal governments.  
The idea that the production of legitimacy is part of a field of contestation and negotiation 
suggests, in addition, that state/non-state relations are complex and changing rather than a fixed 
binary distinction, as is illustrated by the autodefensas’ deployment of discourses of state failure. 
Autodefensas extensively employed these discourses to reflect their perceptions of the way in which 
the cartel had influenced the local and regional state. In doing so they built upon existing feelings in 
the region that the cartel had tapped into, but were far more explicit in their rhetoric, claiming that 
they had no alternative but to take things into their own hands. However, unlike the cartel their 
criticisms did not extend to the Federal state, whom they called on to intervene and re-establish the 
rule of law in the region (e.g. Prados 2013). Therefore, despite their rhetoric of state absence and 
failure they recognised that the Federal state was still an important actor. Autodefensas thus both 
appealed to the state as a legitimate actor to resolve their problems, and sought to challenge the 
state’s legitimacy by exercising control over territory in Michoacán based on their ability to project 
violence and protect the local citizenry from the Knights Templar cartel.  
The autodefensas became de facto governing entities, both challenging and appealing to 
different parts of the state, whilst the state simultaneously did and did not recognise and legitimise 
the autodefensas. One the one hand, the state engaged in prolonged negotiations with the 
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autodefensas, the Federal Police and army undertook operations alongside them, and, ultimately, 
the state sought to institutionalise the autodefensas. Yet, on the other hand, and simultaneously, 
autodefensas were being portrayed as having connections with organised crime, attempts were 
made to disarm them, and those groups who refused institutionalisation were arrested and jailed. 
This complex relationship between autodefensa groups and various state institutions – often 
blurring the lines between the two – illustrates the play of legitimisation and de-legitimisation in the 
(co)construction of governance regimes.  
 Similarly in Colombia, the appeal of discourses of state failure was central to the 
autodefensa groups’ legitimation of violent governance. This was true during their initial emergence 
in the Magdalena Medio region in the early 1980s where they justified their mobilisation with 
reference to the state’s inability or unwillingness to protect the population from the guerrillas 
(Medina Gallego 1990: 178; Romero 2003: 38-39; Mazzei 2009: 81). It was subsequently made 
explicit under Carlos Castaño’s leadership of the nationwide umbrella group for the 
autodefensa/paramilitary groups, the AUC, when he claimed that the organisation played an 
‘important role in keeping this nation from a failed government’ (Wilson 2001; Aranguen 2001: 261-
263). The AUC thus portrayed itself as safe-guarding the state and seeking to ‘re-establish its 
functions’ (Rodrigo Tovar Pupo aka Jorge 40, quoted in, Velásquez Rivera 2007: 1410). In doing so, it 
justified its existence on the basis of anti-subversive principles, by aiding the state to re-establish 
control of its territory. This included the military, which, according to the leadership of AUC had ‘not 
done their institutional duty of guaranteeing Colombians their lives, property, and honor (sic)’, 
hence it fell to the AUC to do ‘a patriotic duty that the military did not want or were not able to do’ 
(Wilson 2001 (their translation)). The autodefensas were thus closely involved with, and their 
formation was supported by, the army and local and national politicians, whilst simultaneously 
claiming that these had failed in their duties (Medina Gallego 1990: 185, 197-198). Although the field 
of contestation and negotiation is produced differently from the Mexican example, the case of 
Colombia equally presents a set of relations that is both complex and dynamic, in which the state is 
not ‘absent’ or ‘failing’ but part of a field in which different claims to legitimacy and identity are 
played out. On their part, the autodefensas deploy state failure as a politics of labelling to justify 
their (legitimate) existence, whilst simultaneously working closely with the state, and especially the 
army (Medina Gallego 1990: 170-172, 178-180).  
For instance, in Magdalena Medio, an important region in the initial development of the 
autodefensas, and in particular the town of Puerto Boyacá, the army played a direct role in setting 
up autodefensas, with support from the rural elite, who were primarily wealthy landowners and 
businessmen, as well as drug traffickers. These seemingly disparate groups had a shared opposition 
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to both the national dialogue instigated by President Betancur, and the guerrilla movements, 
primarily in the form of FARC (Medina Gallego 1990: 146, 170-172, 178-180; Romero 2003: 18-18, 
24). The armed forces, operating under a national security doctrine premised on the counter-
insurgency of the Cold War, felt betrayed by the dialogue with the guerrillas instituted by Betancur, 
and so turned to the civilian population for help in their fight against FARC. The regional elites of 
Magdalena Medio also saw the national dialogue as a betrayal by the central government that 
directly threatened their interests by raising the possibility of land reform. With the growth of the 
narcotics trade, drug-traffickers had started buying land and by the early 1980s had become major 
landholders in Magdalena Medio. Both these sections of society came into conflict with the 
guerrillas who became increasingly aggressive in their implementation of both land taxes- ‘vacunas’ 
(literally- ‘vaccinations’), and their tax on the drug trade- ‘gramaje’ (literally- ‘weight’) (Álvaro 
Rodríguez 2009: 67-68; Mazzei 2009: 79). 
The regional elites, including the autodefensas, employed the idea of state failure to 
mobilise support for their political aims of reversing the policy of national dialogue and guarding 
against rural reform. In this effort, they formed alliances with other groups disillusioned with these 
policies, including state institutions such as the armed forces. This seemingly contradictory position 
of accepting help from parts of the state whilst portraying other sectors of it as failed or failing, 
illustrates the idea of governance as part of a field of contestation and negotiation, in which the 
state is multi-faceted and co-constituted with other groups in society, and legitimacy is continuously 
being produced, contested and negotiated.  
 
4. Neoliberalism, Violence and the Transformation of the State 
The idea of violent pluralism helps to reconceptualise the notions and relations of violence, 
governance, identity and legitimacy in the context of autodefensas. In addition, it situates these 
processes, and the problem of violence, in relation to the development of neoliberalism, which has 
reconfigured the state in recent decades. Arias and Goldstein (2010) argue that the violence 
experienced in contemporary Latin America is a logical result of the unfolding of neoliberal 
democracy. Therefore, when citizens take matters of justice into their own hands, for example in the 
lynchings of criminals in Bolivia, this is not a throwback to previous times, but rather a response to 
insecurity embodied in neoliberal democracy in which individual responsibility is stressed rather 
than reliance on the state (Ibid; Goldstein 2005). The rise of autodefensas could similarly be 
understood as a response to insecurity resulting from neoliberal democracy. 
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Arias and Goldstein are not alone in situating the challenges facing Latin American states, of 
which the emergence of autodefensas are a symptom, in relation to the development of 
neoliberalism in the region from the 1980s onwards. Part of this development, and one of the 
hallmarks of neoliberalism in Latin America, has been a shift towards export-led growth in areas such 
as agriculture. Yet, the growth of the agricultural export economy has not led to benefits for the 
wider community and inequality, poverty and feelings of marginalisation remain. In the case of 
Michoacán, the capital and infrastructure investments required to support the cultivation and 
exportation of agricultural products, such as limes and avocados, is a factor in explaining how drug 
cartels have been able to flourish in the region (Malkin 2001). For example the port of Lazaro 
Cardenas is a major drug transhipment point, both for the import and export of cocaine from Latin 
America and to the USA, but also for the import of precursor chemicals for the fabrication of 
methamphetamines. In Colombia, whilst initially protecting land from the guerrillas, the potential for 
expansion soon became apparent and groups of autodefensa/paramilitaries started to grow and 
develop in different regions and to accumulate increasing amounts of land. The land, from which 
local populations were frequently displaced using violence, could subsequently be sold to local and 
international companies often involved in monoculture agricultural production geared towards 
export to foreign markets. Corporations also used paramilitary groups to safeguard their lands from 
guerrillas and to discipline their workforce, preventing strikes and muting wage and benefit 
demands. For instance, banana companies in the Urabá region, including major international 
companies such as Chiquita, paid paramilitaries per box of bananas for their services (Gentile 2008; 
El Espectador 2008; Lobe & Muscara 2011). 
 For Arias and Goldstein, as for scholars like Morton and Wacquant the relationship between 
neoliberalism and the transformation of the state is of key significance in this context. In his critique 
of state failure approaches, Morton argues that the issues facing Mexico are due to transformations 
of the state resulting from neo-liberal restructuring rather than the failure of the state to develop 
properly. This was particularly felt in Mexico following the signing of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) which, coupled with a reduction in state subsidies, had a significant impact on 
the competitiveness of the agricultural produce of Michoacán (Aguiar 2012: 166-167; Cavanagh et al 
2002: 58-65). The impacts of this transformation of the state, socially and territorially (Maldonado 
Aranda 2013: 46), are key to understanding how and why autodefensas have emerged. Morton 
(2012: 1641) argues that neoliberal policies have stimulated the growth of both the drugs industry 
and levels of money laundering in Mexico, whilst the pretext of the war on drugs helped to protect 
NAFTA.  
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Loïc Wacquant (2008; 2009) stresses that neoliberalism is driven less by the market and 
more by the construction of a particular type of state. The state is increasingly reliant on its punitive 
and coercive branches to shore up its legitimacy in the face of a reduction in its provision of social 
services and welfare to its populations. For instance, Mexican state interventions, beginning under 
Calderón, were characterised by the mass deployment of the Army, Federal Police and Navy. Indeed, 
the Federal response to the autodefensa groups, when it eventually came, was the deployment of 
further troops. Whilst this was accompanied by promises of funds to rebuild the social fabric of the 
region, such programmes were quickly decommissioned whilst the troops often remained. 
Wacquant (2007) argues that these interventions are characterised by territorial stigmatisation and 
labelling of certain areas as violent, lawless and as ‘black holes’, which enables them to be treated 
differently. For instance, areas such as the Tierra Caliente region have been portrayed as a lawless 
and violent area, characterised by a violent population and hostile terrain (Maldonado 2012). 
In Colombia, President Alvaro Uribe’s Democratic Security Policy consisted of a 
confrontational stance towards the FARC guerrillas, involving the use of the Army to push into areas 
previously controlled by such groups. The effort to establish state presence in these areas bore out 
much of the criticisms autodefensa/paramilitary groups had levelled against the state, as it was 
present primarily through its coercive arms, the Police and the Army. In the case of the ‘Push to the 
South’6, this involved the support of paramilitary forces, which were transported in from other parts 
of the country by the Army to assist in the offensive. In this case, too, the production of a 
(legitimate) presence through violent governance involves a blurring of the distinction between state 
and non-state. As the presence of the state was limited to the Army and Police, it could co-exist with 
the violent governance of paramilitary groups and helped spread the neoliberal transformation of 
the state to other areas (see for example Rodríguez González 2014). These examples illustrate that 
(violent) governance produces and operates as a field of contestation and negotiation, whereby 
various groups challenge the legitimacy and identity of other groups whilst simultaneously being 
implicated in and supporting it in other ways. This has led scholars such as Civico (2015), to claim 
that far from being a sign of state weakness, and despite their rhetoric of state failure, such groups 
can in some way be seen to strengthen the state, albeit in a perverse form conditioned by its 
neoliberal nature and insertion into the world economy.     
However, these developments – the entwinement of (non-)state groups; the state’s 
attempts at delegitimising and stigmatising certain groups and regions; and, the perception of the 
state’s violent interventions as creating further violence – are not new and have a long history. It is 
therefore too simplistic to attribute all such developments to the advent of neoliberalism. Rather, as 
Arias and Goldstein suggest, these underlying issues and conflicts have been aggravated and brought 
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to greater prominence under the influence of neoliberal policies, which have exacerbated pre-
existing problems and created feelings of abandonment. Therefore, the rhetorical portrayal of the 
state as failed by the autodefensas can be better understood as voicing people’s long-held 
perception of being abandoned by the state and being side-lined by the national project (e.g. Malkin 
2001). The cartel and the autodefensas, have utilised such ideas to gain legitimacy for their 
alternative governance, and indeed their very presence as sources of governance reflect the ways in 
which the state and state-society relations have changed under neoliberalism. Therefore, despite 
the very real presence of the state – especially in the form of the coercive branches – and the 
investments in infrastructure that has been made, because of the purposes for which such 
interventions are carried out, and the manner in which they are undertaken, the population does 
not feel that the state is present in the ways in which they want it to be so.  
 
5. (Non)violent (dis)ordering 
The notion of violent pluralism helps to contextualise the role of neoliberalism in the 
development of relations among and transformations of (non)state groups in Latin America. In 
addition, and relatedly, it enables a conceptualisation of politics in terms of (violent) struggle and 
conflict (Arias and Goldstein 2010: 15). We have developed these insights into the idea of 
governance as a field of contestation and negotiation whereby different groups produce, challenge, 
contest, enable and negotiate legitimacy and identity through violent means. As illustrated by the 
autodefensas in Mexico and Colombia, violence can bring into question existing social norms and 
enable the formation of political order and of new modes of political subjectivity (Ibid: 23-24).  
We will develop these insights in two directions. Firstly, whilst violence is often associated 
with disorder, the case of autodefensas shows is also constitutive of forms of order(ing). We will 
push this idea further by suggesting that the relationship violence-governance-legitimacy is 
characterised by the simultaneity and inextricability of ordering and disordering (Ansems de Vries 
2014). Secondly, and following this, conceiving of governance as a field of contestation and 
negotiation constituted by a play of (dis)ordering also raises the question of the role of non-violence, 
and the relationship between violence and non-violence. We argue that, in this field, (dis)order and 
(non)violence are continuously produced and reproduced and become difficult to tell apart.  
In other words, whilst we argue that violence is highly significant in the autodefensas’ 
production of legitimacy and identity, these processes cannot be reduced to violence alone. Arias 
and Goldstein’s writing underemphasises the idea that non-violence, intricately entangled with 
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violent practices, plays a constitutive role as well. For example, in Colombia groups such as 
ACDEGAM (Asociación Campesina de Ganaderos y Agricultores del Magdalena Medio) were set-up 
by key supporters of the autodefensas in the Magdalena Medio region, drawn from the land owning 
elites who had a vested interest in countering the threat that the guerrilla groups faced. Such groups 
were utilised to lobby the local and national governments as well as to drum up support amongst 
the local populace. Therefore, violence was used to help construct an identity for the autodefensas 
and define their constituency, but their supporters also tried to build links to civil society and the 
different levels of the state. Thus, paramilitary and autodefensa groups made widespread use of 
‘spectacular’ violence such as massacres and the limpieza social but they also developed other forms 
of violent and nonviolent governance, for instance through the provision of a form of alternative law 
and order in the communities they controlled. This involved both the killing of thieves and members 
of gangs and a graduated system of punishments and the arbitration of social behaviour (Civico 
2015). For example, husbands who beat wives or members of gangs would be given warnings to 
change their behaviour or face more serious consequences (Caraballo Acuña 2010).  
Sanford (2004) notes that towns controlled by such groups experienced close to no crime of 
the common or garden sort. Whilst this does not mitigate the violence these groups committed, in 
particular when they first took over towns, it does help to explain how they gained legitimacy as 
some Colombians saw them as providing a form of order (Civico 2015). Other non-violent practices 
that helped to produce legitimacy consisted in the provision of social goods to communities, which is 
especially significant in the context of the neo-liberal reforms discussed above. This included the 
provision of services, investment in infrastructure and the construction of public buildings, such as 
the school financed by Fidel Castaño in Magdalena Medio (Dudley 2004). Violent and non-violent 
practices of governance are thus closely entwined and whilst the extent of the latter may well have 
been overstated by paramilitary leaders in their testimonies, the wide range of scholars referring to 
such non-violent practices (e.g. Lara 2000; Civico 2015; Aranguen 2001; Romero 2003; Medina 
Gallego 1990; Dudley 2004; Caraballo Acuña 2010) suggest their significance as part of paramilitary 
and autodefensa practices of governance. Autodefensas thus challenged the state (and other 
groups) in some ways, co-operated with them in other ways, and took on state-like activities and 
appearances through both violent and non-violent practices, or indeed through the blurring of these. 
These practices of (non)violence thus had both ordering and disordering effects.  
In Mexico, various groups employed culture and religion in the production, contestation and 
negotiation of legitimacy and identity. This plays out, for instance, with respect to the contestation 
between the Knights Templar cartel and the autodefensas over their respective Michoacán 
identities. The Knights Templar cartel and their predecessor, La Familia Michoacana, had strongly 
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emphasised this identity, claiming to protect the local citizenry against the barbarity of ‘foreign’ 
cartels from other states, whereby the autodefensas were portrayed as stooges of these ‘foreign’ 
cartels. The autodefensas contested these claims by presenting themselves as a popular social 
movement comprised of ordinary local people (Le Cour Grandmaison 2014: 7; Prados 2013). The 
autodefensas employed non-violent – or violent non-violent – methods to reinforce their local 
identity whilst directly challenging the cartel’s methods of attracting and cementing social support. 
In particular, they used corridos (traditional ballads from rural Mexico used to tell stories set to folk 
music) to recount their struggles and exploits. These mirrored the cartels’ narco-corridos, which are 
the same kind of ballads, extensively exploited by the cartels to commemorate their actions and 
attract social support7 (McGirk 2010). Here, music operates as a field of contestation: song is 
employed in a battle for both territory and identity, blurring the lines between violence and non-
violence as non-violent means are utilised to support, justify and commemorate violent acts.  
This (non)violent employment of identity is also visible with respect to religion. Importantly, 
La Familia Michoacana had portrayed themselves as a quasi-religious sect which promoted family 
values and whose members were teetotal. The Knights Templar continued this trend, and also 
portrayed its leaders such as ‘El Chayo’ (Nazario Moreno González – also a key leader of La Familia 
Michoacana) as religious figures. In response to this the autodefensas demonstrated their links to 
established church figures who spoke in support of the autodefensas such as Father Patricio 
Madrigal8, priest of Nueva Italia, Miguel Patiño Velásquez, the Bishop of Apatzingan, and José Luis 
Suárez Barragán, priest of La Ruana (Calderón 2014; Chouza 2013; Prados 2013). By emphasising this 
link to the established church the autodefensas sought to legitimate themselves in the eyes of the 
public, whilst challenging the Knights Templar’s supposed religious credentials. This was particularly 
important because the Church was regarded as the only institution in the region that had not been 
infiltrated and corrupted by the Knights Templar.  
The co-operation between members of the church and the autodefensas is also illustrated 
by their joint announcement of a civil society movement called “Yo soy autodefensa”. This group had 
the objective of calling for the imposition of security and the law across Mexico, and was 
characterised as an unarmed social movement by its founders (Chouza 2014). The “Yo soy 
autodefensas” movement provides an interesting meeting point between the autodefensas’ 
construction of the state as having failed, and its identity as a violent actor pursuing non-violent 
means, in league with the local church, to secure its position and negotiate with the Federal state. 
Here, too, violence and non-violence are intricately linked in the constitution of legitimacy and 
identity. Moreover, as in previous examples, socio-political (dis)order, legitimacy and political 
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identity are continuously produced, negotiated and contested, rather than a state that can be 
achieved once and for all.  
Governance and legitimacy thus continue to operate in a field of contestation and 
negotiation – and a process of ordering and disordering simultaneously – despite the state’s 
attempts at gaining a monopoly of legitimate control. Given the control of some areas by the 
autodefensas, and the failure of initial attempts at disarmament, the state’s engagement with 
autodefensas were marked by co-operation and contestation simultaneously. Collaboration was 
enabled by the perception of the cartel as a shared enemy (at least to some extent) and the fact that 
the autodefensas had not positioned themselves directly against the state. Yet, such collaboration 
also undermined the state’s legitimacy by working with an ‘illegal’ armed group. The state’s 
perceived need to position itself ‘against’ a particular group in order to reinforce the distinction 
between the ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’, the ‘legitimate’ and the ‘illegitimate’, and state and non-state, 
shows the continued importance of producing such binaries in societal imaginings even when the 
situation is acknowledged to be more complex. Thus, whilst the case of autodefensas shows that 
socio-political order(ing) is produced through complex processes of contestation, disruption, 
negotiation and collaboration simultaneously, in which the distinctions between (il)legal, (non)state, 
(il)legitimate and (non)violence blur, we argue that it also shows that such distinctions continue to 
be important with respect to the production of legitimacy and identity by various groups.  
From May 2014, the Mexican state sought to institutionalise the autodefensa groups 
through their inclusion in the Fuerza Rural (Rural Defence Force) and criminalise those who refused 
to either demobilise or join the Fuerza Rural, such as those led by Dr Mireles who had become 
increasingly critical of the state intervention. Here, too, the distinction between the legal and the 
illegal is reinforced in order to gain control over a situation in which many lines have become 
blurred. Yet, the fact that these lines remained blurred and shifting in practice is illustrated by the 
process of institutionalisation, which consisted of simply swapping weapons for state issued rifles 
and being given official uniforms and vehicles etc., rather than displacing the regimes of (violent) 
governance the autodefensas had in place. Whilst an effort to be seen as the only legitimate armed 
actor, the state’s institutionalisation of another armed group helped to legitimise the control and 
(violent) governance of the autodefensas more than undermine it.    
 
6. Conclusion 
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The autodefensas of Michoacán and Colombia have been officially disbanded and/or 
institutionalised, yet the issues that provoked their emergence, their actual presence, and (the 
effects of) their practices of violent governance have not gone away. In Michoacán, some 
autodefensas have continued to operate whilst others periodically threaten to remobilise, stating 
that the problems of insecurity remain unchanged. Likewise, in Colombia the peace deal between 
the Colombian government and FARC has brought about a renewed focus on paramilitarism and the 
‘bandas criminales’ (ICG 2007) that still operate and indeed are highly active, targeting social, human 
rights and land reconstitution leaders with renewed vigour.   
Through the employment, critique and enrichment of the notions of state failure and violent 
pluralism we have developed four points regarding the relationship between violence, governance, 
legitimacy and identity in the context of autodefensas in Mexico and Colombia. Firstly, rather than 
evaluating in which ways the existence of autodefensas can be seen as an expression of state failure, 
and rather than merely developing a critique of state failure literature, we have shown that state 
failure is not merely a problematic ‘external’ (Western) imposition leading to various forms of 
intervention, but also a strategic means of making claims by ‘internal’ groups. The autodefensas 
have skilfully appropriated the notion of state failure that functioned to delegitimise the context in 
which they operated, turning it on its head to legitimise their actions. We have developed the notion 
of a field of contestation and negotiation to show how different groups make claims and counter-
claims to both failure and legitimacy. This field of contestation and negotiation is thus constituted by 
a range of practices of (non)violent governance and a range of (non)state groups – blurring the 
distinctions between the two – and productive of political order(ing) and identities. Moreover, it is 
not merely a matter of material and/or territorial practices but also encompasses discursive 
relations of power/knowledge, such as the ability to make a claim that provokes a reaction that 
helps to legitimise it.  
Secondly, we have employed the notion of violent pluralism, which enables a 
conceptualisation of politics as a field of struggle constitutive of political order(ing) and identity, to 
make sense of the violent legitimisation of practices and identities in a way that challenges the 
linking of state and legitimacy, and violence and disorder. Rather than a state that can be achieved, 
legitimacy is understood as a continuous process of production, contestation and negotiation, part 
of a broader field of contestation and negotiation that includes a wide range of practices of 
governance. Violence, as a form of governance employed to produce legitimacy, has effects of both 
ordering and disordering: it might establish control over a territory, challenge extant governance 
practices, create trust and/or distrust among the local population, disrupt and/or establish practices 
of extortion, etc. In addition, the notion of violent pluralism helps to make sense of the role of 
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neoliberal restructuring in the functioning and identity of the state, especially in relation to the 
violent practices of governance and claims to legitimacy by other groups such as autodefensas, but 
also with respect to the entanglement of state and non-state groups. As we have shown, neoliberal 
restructuring is not synonymous with the absence of the state per se, however, the employment of 
failed state discourse by autodefensas suggests that feelings of abandonment and ambivalence 
towards state presence have provided a fertile ground for such claims.  
Thirdly, we have pointed out that, despite its value for understanding the complexity of 
relations at play, the concept of violent pluralism under-emphasises non-violent practices and fails 
to address the relationship between violence and non-violence. The idea of a field of contestation 
and negotiation does enable an examination of these relationships, showing the inextricability of 
violence and non-violence in the context of autodefensas. Whilst violence is central to practices of 
governance on behalf of autodefensas, these groups also engage in less violent practices, including 
the formation of civil society organisations and engagement in cultural and religious traditions and 
performances, in their efforts to construct, contest and negotiate their legitimacy and identity. Or, 
indeed, given the simultaneity and co-constitution of these processes, practices of violence and non-
violence become blurred and difficult to tell apart. This raises an important and underexplored 
question: If the threat and deployment of violence seem so pervasive, as is the case in relations 
between autodefensas and other groups, what kinds of practices and discourse can still be 
understood as truly non-violent? The present article has begun to address this issue, yet it requires 
further exploration.  
Finally, in addition to challenging the (binary) distinction between violence and non-
violence, the article has called into question a number of other binaries. Indeed, our examination of 
the production and contestation of legitimacy and identity through (violent) governance in the 
context of autodefensas has shown that political order(ing) is produced through complex processes 
of contestation, disruption, negotiation and collaboration simultaneously, in which the distinctions 
between (il)legal, (non)state, (il)legitimate and (non)violence blur and transform. However, this is 
not a call for dismissal of these binaries as irrelevant, rather we argue that the binary and complex 
are co-constitutive. In the context of autodefensas, binary distinctions continue to be employed by a 
range of groups in their discursive and material efforts to produce, justify, challenge, contest and 
negotiate their own and others’ legitimacy and identity.  
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